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Abstract In this paper, we examine non-parametric restrictions on counterfactual
analysis in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption of
time-separable expected utility and complete markets all equilibria in this model are
stationary. The Arrow-Debreu prices uniquely reveal the probabilities and discount
factor. The equilibrium correspondence, defined as the map from endowments to sta-
tionary (probability-free) state prices, is identical to the equilibrium correspondence
in a standard Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with additively separable utility. We
examine possible restriction on this correspondence and give necessary as well as
sufficient conditions on profiles of individual endowments that ensure that associated
equilibrium prices cannot be arbitrary. Although restrictions on possible price changes
often exist, we show that results from a representative-agent economy usually do not
carry over to a setting with heterogeneous agents.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates how equilibrium prices may change as profiles of endow-
ments vary in a dynamic asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents. In this model
all competitive equilibria are stationary if all agents maximize time-separable ex-
pected utility and individual endowments follow time-homogeneous Markov chains.
In fact, there is a one-to-one relation between the equilibrium correspondence in this
model and the equilibrium correspondence of a standard static Arrow-Debreu ex-
change economy with additively separable utility. We use the non-parametric analysis
of Brown and Matzkin (1996) to explore observable restrictions on this equilibrium
correspondence. The three main results are as follows. First, we show that equilib-
rium price changes can be arbitrary if individual endowments vary but aggregate
endowments are held fixed. Second, we show that changes in aggregate endowments
always lead to ‘predictable’ price changes, if in at least one state aggregate endow-
ments weakly decrease while in some other state all individuals’ endowments in-
crease. Last, we show that restrictions from the representative-agent version of the
model are neither necessary nor sufficient for restrictions in a heterogeneous agents
economy.
Dynamic general equilibrium models play a prominent role in modern macroeco-
nomics, finance, and public finance. While stochastic dynamic models with hetero-
geneous agents have become increasingly important in this literature, there are few
general results on counterfactual analysis.1 In applied work, computational experi-
ments are often successfully employed to explore the effects of exogenous changes
in taxes or transfers on equilibrium allocations and prices. In this literature all indi-
viduals in the economy are often assumed to have identical homothetic utility, but
the computational results appear relatively robust with respect to small changes in
preferences. Many results in this literature depend crucially on the exact parametric
specification of preferences and, from a theoretical viewpoint, it might appear that
without any assumptions on preferences almost any counterfactual analysis could be
possible. While Brown and Matzkin (1996) successfully challenge the view that with-
out parametric assumptions on preferences ‘anything goes’ in general equilibrium
analysis, there have been few attempts in the literature to characterize the exact form
of the observable restrictions and there are no results for infinite horizon stochastic
economies frequently used in applied work. This paper addresses this void in the
economic literature.
1 The use of the term “counterfactual analysis” in this paper is inspired by the usage of the term “counter-
factual policy analysis” in macroeconomics. We use this term in the sense of a global comparative statics
analysis and want to distinguish our analysis from purely local comparative statics or marginal analysis,
often used in consumer and producer theory.
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For the investigation of counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with heter-
ogeneous agents we consider the simplest possible case and ask what happens to
equilibrium prices as profiles of individual endowments change. We regard the con-
sideration of changes in individual endowments as a first step towards understanding
the more complicated comparative statics exercises arising in applied work.
We consider a version of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with heterogeneous
investors. All exogenous variables follow a finite Markov chain and all individuals
maximize time-separable expected utility with identical beliefs and discounting. When
markets are dynamically complete, all asset market equilibria are equivalent to Arrow-
Debreu equilibria with stationary consumption allocations (see e.g., Kubler and
Schmedders 2003). We show that the price system reveals uniquely the agents’ beliefs
and discount factor. If there are S possible shocks, the prices can, in fact, be decom-
posed into the S × S transition probability matrix, a discount factor and S strictly
positive ‘probability-free prices’ that are unique up to a normalization. The question
is then what restrictions exist on the changes of these probability-free prices.
The results depend to some extent on the preference assumptions. The assumption
of time-separable expected utility leaves open the possibility that felicity functions are
shock-dependent. Melino and Yang (2003) and Danthine et al. (2004) emphasize the
usefulness of this assumption for explaining standard asset pricing puzzles. The focus
of this paper is on economies where utility functions can be shock dependent. In a
working-paper version (Kubler and Schmedders 2007) we compare the results to the
case of state-independent utility. It is not easily possible to extend the analysis to the
case of Epstein-Zin or recursive utility since under this specification Pareto-efficient
allocations are generally no longer stationary (see e.g., Dumas et al. 2000). Kubler
(2003) examines the case for finite non-stationary economies and shows that there are
some restrictions under recursive utility.
Under our assumption of shock-dependent felicity functions, restrictions on prices
exist—even in the single-agent framework—only if in at least one shock aggregate
endowments decrease while in some other they increase. With several agents, changes
in the income distribution with aggregate endowments held fixed can have arbitrary
effects on equilibrium prices. These results have potentially important implications
for applied modeling. Without parametric assumptions on preferences, there are no
restrictions on price changes resulting from a change in the wealth distribution, i.e.,
the introduction of purely redistributive taxes can have arbitrary effects. However,
we also show that if all agents’ individual endowments increase in one shock, while
aggregate endowments weakly decrease in some other shock, the associated prices
cannot be arbitrary. This condition is in line with the intuition that if in some state
aggregate endowments decrease while in some other they increase, prices must change
in a predictable way. If applied work considers policy experiments that have aggre-
gate effects, the resulting price changes cannot be arbitrary. These results also raise
the question how the restrictions in a model with several agents that arise through
changes in aggregate endowments are related to restriction in the representative-agent
model.
In models with complete financial markets, under the assumption that all agents
maximize time-separable expected utility, there exists a pricing representative agent:
Any given competitive equilibrium price system can be viewed as supporting prices
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for a single individual who consumes aggregate endowments (see e.g., Constanti-
nides 1982). However, obviously, this fact does not imply that in models with het-
erogeneous agents, results from counterfactual analysis are similar to the ones in a
model with a single agent. In this paper, we investigate if there are any restrictions on
global comparative statics in models with several agents and how they compare to the
single-agent intuition. We show that there exist changes in endowments for which
there exist restrictions on associated prices in a model with several agents even if
there are no restrictions in the single-agent model, given the changes in aggregate
endowments. Conversely, as already noted above, the existence of restrictions in a
single-agent economy does not imply restrictions in economies with several agents,
if individual endowments can be chosen freely. Even if individual endowments are
collinear, the qualitative predictions from the heterogeneous agent model are very
different from the ones in the single agent economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the
model and show its equivalence to a static Arrow-Debreu model with additively sep-
arable utility. In Sect. 3, we motivate why we are interested in counterfactual analysis
and show how in this model beliefs can be identified separately from prices. Section 4
presents necessary as well as sufficient conditions on changes in endowments for
equilibrium price changes not to be arbitrary. In Sect. 5, we compare the restriction of
the model with several agents to restrictions that arise in the single-agent framework.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The dynamic exchange economy
We consider a dynamic exchange economy under uncertainty with a single perishable
good each period. Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, . . . , T ≤ ∞. Uncertainty is driven by
exogenous shocks st that take values in a finite set S = {1, 2, . . . , S} and follow a
Markov chain with transition matrix π . Without loss of generality we assume that
s0 = 1. A date-event is a finite history of shocks, σ = st = (s0, s1, . . . , st ) and the set
of all date-events (nodes) of the event tree is denoted by . We write σ for a generic
node in the tree and collect all nodes at some time t in Nt = {st }. We write π(st )
for the period zero probability of node st and π(st−1, st ) for the one-period transition
probabilities, that is, the elements of the matrix π .
There are H types of T -period (possibly infinitely) lived agents, h ∈ H =
{1, 2, . . . , H}. Individual endowments are a time-invariant function of the exoge-
nous shock alone, eh(st ) = e¯h(st ) with e¯h : S → R++. Agents have time-separable
expected utility (EU) preferences represented by the utility function
U h(c) = E0
T∑
t=0
β t uh(c(st ), st ),
where β ∈ (0, 1), and for each s ∈ S, uh(·, s) : R+ → R is strictly concave, strictly
increasing and continuous for c > 0.
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2.1 Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
In this paper, we abstract from asset markets and simply assume that markets for com-
modities across all nodes of the event tree are complete (see Kubler and Schmedders
2003 for a formal analysis of the model with asset markets). We can therefore describe
the resulting Arrow-Debreu economy simply as a collection of utility functions and
individual endowments (U h, eh)h∈H. An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for this economy
is defined in standard fashion as a collection of state prices p(σ ) > 0 and consumption
allocations ch(σ ) ≥ 0 for all nodes σ ∈  such that
1. Markets clear,
∑
h∈H(ch(σ ) − eh(σ )) = 0 for all σ ∈ ;
2. Agents optimize, ∀h ∈ H (ch(σ ))σ∈ ∈ arg max U h(c) s. t.
∑
σ∈
p(σ )c(σ ) =
∑
σ∈
p(σ )eh(σ ) < ∞.
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists and both the first and second welfare theorem hold
for these economies (Bewley 1972). The following lemma provides the key to tracta-
ble computations in stationary models with many periods. The lemma is well known,
see for example the textbook by Duffie (1988) or Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
Lemma 1 Given an efficient allocation (ch(σ ))h∈Hσ∈ , the individual consumptions
must be time-invariant functions of the shock alone, i.e., there exist c¯ : S → RH+
such that for all st ∈  and all h ∈ H, ch(st ) = c¯h(st ).
Kubler and Schmedders (2003) show how the model can be reformulated as a
model of a “stochastic finance economy” with stock and bond markets (i.e., a Lucas
tree economy with heterogeneous agents but dynamically complete markets) and prove
for generic asset payoffs that the Arrow-Debreu and the finance model are equivalent.
We focus on the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in this paper but most of our results extend
to the equivalent model.
The lemma implies that the Euler equations show that for any Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium prices (p(st )), the expression p(st )/(β tπ(st )) just depends on the current
shock st but not on the history. We can therefore define stationary probability-free
prices by ρ(st ) ≡ p(st )π(st )β t for all st ∈ S. Based on this definition we next define the
equilibrium correspondence as the map ω : RH S++ → RS++ from H S-dimensional
profiles of endowments to S-dimensional equilibrium prices ρ = (ρ(s))s∈S by
ω(eh) =
{
ρ ∈ RS++ : (ρ(st )β tπ(st ))st∈ are Arrow-Debreu prices
for the economy with endowments eh
}
.
2.2 Reduction to finitely many goods
We can impose the fact that each agent makes stationary consumption choices
in any Arrow-Debreu equilibrium directly in the budget constraints. Therefore, we
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can reformulate an agent’s budget constraint
∑
σ∈ p(σ )(c(σ ) − eh(σ )) = 0 as
follows:
ρ(s0)(c(s0) − e(s0)) +
T∑
t=1
β t
∑
st∈Nt
π(st )ρ(st )(c(st ) − e(st )) = 0.
Note that consumptions and endowments at time t only depend on the current shock
st and not on any part of the history before t . For t = 2, . . . , T define (recursively)
the t-fold product of the Markov transition matrix, π t = π · π t−1. Observe that the
probabilities in the first row of π t yield the distribution for the current state in period
t since we assumed w.l.o.g. that the economy starts in state s0 = 1. Next define
 = ∑Tt=0 β tπ t and let φ = (φ1, . . . , φS) denote the first row of the matrix . We
sometimes write φ(β, π) to make explicit the dependence on the discount factor and
the transition probabilities.
Each agent’s utility maximization problem, being reduced to stationary consump-
tion choices, can now be written as
max
S∑
s=1
φsu
h(c(s), s) subject to
S∑
s=1
φsρ(s)(c(s) − e(s)) = 0.
Observe that an equilibrium is now a vector of prices ρ ∈ RS++ and choices ch ∈ RS+
for all h ∈ H such that each agent maximizes utility and markets clear. This obser-
vation implies that any restriction on the equilibrium correspondence of a Walrasian
model (i.e., an Arrow-Debreu model with finitely many commodities) with separable
utility translates one to one, to restrictions of the intertemporal model (prices are just
the Walrasian prices, multiplied by φs and vice versa). The following notation proves
useful: φ ◦ ρ = (φ1ρ(1), . . . , φSρ(S)).
3 Non-parametric counterfactual analysis
The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible changes in Walrasian equilib-
rium prices that may result when agents’ individual endowments vary. Our objective
is to perform this examination in much generality. For this purpose we do not choose
particular functional forms for utility functions but instead rely on a non-paramet-
ric approach along the lines of the methodology in the seminal paper by Brown and
Matzkin (1996). Brown and Matzkin use the so-called Afriat inequalities (Afriat 1967)
to examine whether observations on individual endowments and prices yield restric-
tions on the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence. In this paper we use the Afriat
inequalities to analyze global comparative statics for the dynamic model of the previ-
ous section.
Section 3.1 introduces and motivates the non-parametric approach to counterfac-
tual analysis. We often maintain the language of the literature started by Brown and
Matzkin (1996) even though it may sound unusual at times for a comparative statics
analysis. For example, we adopt the term ‘observations’ to refer to different speci-
fications of endowments together with equilibrium prices. We argue below how our
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analysis can be interpreted within the methodological framework laid out by Brown
and Matzkin (1996) but also give an alternative interpretation. Section 3.2 develops the
Afriat inequalities for our model. Lemma 3 states simplified necessary and sufficient
conditions for the inequalities to hold. Section 3.3 completes the development of our
framework with the statement of Lemma 4, a special version of the main result of
Brown and Matzkin (1996) for our model. The lemma provides necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for prices to occur in a Walrasian equilibrium for given individual
endowments.
3.1 A set-up for global comparative statics
We consider N profiles of individual endowments eh(i) for h ∈ H and i ∈ E =
{1, 2, . . . , N } with eh(i) = (eh1 (i), . . . , ehS(i)) ∈ RS++ and say that associated prices
(pσ (i))i∈E,σ∈ are consistent with equilibrium if there are (ρ(i))i∈E , β ∈ (0, 1) and
a Markov transition matrix π with
ρ(st ) = p(s
t )
π(st )β t
for all st ∈ S,
and if there is an equilibrium correspondence, ω, such that
ρ(i) ∈ ω
(
(eh(i))h∈H
)
for all i ∈ E .
We sometimes refer to ((eh(i))h∈H, p(i))i∈E as ‘observations’. Since we do not
require endowments to be different across specifications, we trivially make statements
about the equilibrium set of a given economy.
We ask which price changes are consistent with changes in the profile of individual
endowments. For our model with a large and possible infinite event tree examining the
vector (for finite T ) or the sequence (for T = ∞) of such prices may at first appear
rather daunting. However, the assumption that the observations are generated by an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the underlying dynamic exchange economy puts a lot of
structure on the equilibrium prices. In particular, we can prove that the Arrow-Debreu
prices can be uniquely decomposed into transition probabilities π , the discount factor
β and probability free prices ρ.
3.1.1 Beliefs versus prices
The absence of arbitrage and the stationarity of the equilibrium allocations implies
a one-to-one relation between Arrow-Debreu prices, (p(σ ))σ∈ , and the prices of
‘one-period Arrow securities’. Let as,s′ = p(st+1)/p(st ) whenever st+1 = s′ and
st = s, that is, as,s′ is the price of a one-period security that pays one unit of the
consumption good in the next period if state s′ occurs and nothing in all other states.
Let A = (as,s′)Ss,s′=1 be the S × S matrix of the prices of all such one-period Arrow
securities. Theorem 1 states if these prices are equilibrium prices, then the underlying
transition probabilities and the discount factor can be recovered uniquely.
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Theorem 1 For a given matrix of one-period Arrow security prices A, there exists a
unique Markov transition matrix π , a unique discount factor 0 < β < 1 and prices
ρ ∈ RS++, unique up to a normalization, such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
as,s′ = βπ(s, s′)ρs′
ρs
.
Proof We prove that for a given positive matrix A the nonlinear system of S2 equations
as,s′
ρs
ρs′
= βπ(s, s′)
in the unknown discount factor β, transition matrix π , and probability-free prices ρ has
a unique positive solution. Summing all equations for fixed s and using the property
of π that all row elements sum to 1 we obtain
S∑
s′=1
as,s′
ρs
ρs′
= β for all s ∈ S.
Defining γs = 1/ρs and γ = (γ1, . . . , γS), we obtain the linear system of equations
(A − β IS×S) γ = 0,
where IS×S denotes the S × S identity matrix. Note that this system of linear equa-
tions is just the system defining the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix A!
The classical Perron–Frobenius theorem (see e.g., Horn and Johnson 1985) implies
that the positive matrix A has a unique largest real eigenvalue, β∗, that is positive and
associated with a positive real eigenvector, γ ∗. Furthermore all other eigenvalues are
associated with eigenvectors that are not non-negative. Therefore, there is only one
solution for β > 0 with associated γ > 0. Since the elements of the matrix A are
generated by our dynamic exchange economy this unique solution must also satisfy
β < 1. Furthermore, note that ρs/ρs′ = γs′/γs and so the prices ρ are also uniquely—
up to a normalization—determined which finally leads to a unique transition matrix π .
unionsq
The equilibrium conditions of our dynamic exchange economy immediately imply
that for a given discount factor β, a given transition matrix π , and probability-
free prices ρ there exist uniquely determined Arrow-Debreu equilibrium prices.
Theorem 1 establishes the converse of this property. From an observation of Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium prices we can recover the transition matrix and agents’ discount
factor in addition to probability-free state prices. This recoverability of the transition
matrix and the discount factor has an important consequence for our analysis in this
paper. We do not need to make a case distinction depending on whether (or not) we
know the transition probabilities and discount factors. Given the assumption of the
observability of Arrow-Debreu prices we can immediately assume that we know β
and π .
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The result of Theorem 1 resembles the work of Wang (1993), Cuoco and Zapa-
tero (2000) and others on the recoverability problem of preferences and beliefs in a
continuous-time infinite-horizon economy with dynamically complete financial mar-
kets. The methods in this literature are very different from our application of the
Perron–Frobenius theorem here. For example, the analysis of Markovian equilibria in
a continuous-time setting requires (Cuoco and Zapatero 2000) to examine a Riccati
differential equation.
3.1.2 Interpretation
Based on Theorem 1 restrictions on global comparative statics can always be viewed
in two parts. First, different price systems across multiple observations must reveal the
same beliefs and discount factor. Second, only the probability-free prices can change
across multiple observations. We say that there exist restrictions on prices, if, given N
profiles of endowments (eh(i))h∈Hi∈E , there exist (ρ(i))i∈E  0 that are not consistent
with equilibrium. For the investigation of restrictions on the probability-free prices, we
consider restrictions on the equilibrium correspondence ω as defined in Sect. 2.1. In
the following, we always assume that prices are strictly positive and that endowments
are nonnegative.
The restrictions on the equilibrium correspondence of the dynamic model must
be identical to those of the standard Walrasian model when utility is separable. For
general non-separable utility, these restrictions have first been investigated by Brown
and Matzkin (1996) who give an example to show that some restrictions exist. Brown
and Matzkin interpret their exercise in terms of refutability of the general equilibrium
model. They give necessary and sufficient conditions on the equilibrium correspon-
dence and reserve the term ‘comparative statics’ for necessary conditions only.
In a dynamic general equilibrium model, what is observable is generally only
one equilibrium. Testable restrictions on possible equilibrium prices then come from
assumptions on preferences (over and above expected time-separable utility, see Kubler
(2003)). Here we examine changes in prices as endowments vary, i.e., we consider
equilibria of different economies.
We interpret this endowment change as the result of an unanticipated policy change
to which all agents in the economy assign probability zero. If at some node st , a transfer
and lump-sum tax scheme is introduced without agents in the economy anticipating so,
equilibrium prices are going to adjust instantly to the new equilibrium corresponding
to different endowments. This is the classic exercise of counterfactual policy analysis
which is standard in public finance and macro. Researchers fix functional forms for
utility and production functions and use numerical methods to compute equilibrium
for different specifications of the exogenous variables. Here we ask the fundamental
question if anything can be said without fixing functional forms. We examine a sim-
pler model and simpler comparative statics than commonly used in applications but
do so under very general assumptions without using parametric functional forms.
We thus view our results as a first step towards a general non-parametric policy
analysis.
Alternatively, and more in line with Brown and Matzkin (1996) original approach
one can interpret the exercise as a ‘structural break’ and interpret the results as
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‘observable restrictions’. Either all agents attach zero probability to this structural
break or else it is completely uninsurable, that is, no asset pays contingent on this
shock to the economy occurring. If there are Lucas trees or other multi-period assets
in the economy, it is a very strong assumption that the structural break is not insurable,
since it amounts to saying that in that state, all trees become worthless, that is, they
no longer pay any dividends from there on. The presence of Lucas trees also makes
the interpretation of an unanticipated change more complicated. The new endowment
profiles now consist of the actual individual endowments plus the dividends of the
Lucas trees an individual held at the time of the change. It is subject to further re-
search to explore this interpretation in more detail.
3.2 Individual Afriat inequalities
For the characterization of competitive equilibria Brown and Matzkin (1996) use the
Afriat inequalities and examine if observed aggregate demand can be expressed as the
sum of (unknown) individual choices which satisfy those inequalities and a budget
constraint. Brown and Matzkin (1996) give an example showing that these conditions
are not vacuous. In a simple model with two agents and two commodities, it is possi-
ble to find variations of endowments and prices that are inconsistent with equilibrium.
In our framework we need to consider slightly different conditions, since utility is
additively separable across states. This fact implies that the conditions of Brown and
Matzkin remain necessary but are no longer sufficient.
Afriat (1967) formulates a system of linear inequalities which characterize a finite
set of observations of individual choices arising from utility maximization. His tech-
niques can be applied to a wide variety of frameworks. For example, Afriat inequali-
ties can characterize optimal asset demand, savings and demand of goods, see Varian
(1983a,b). The basic ideas are to assume that the utility function is strictly concave and
continuous, to use the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to characterize optimality, to relate the
subgradient of the utility function to prices, and to characterize concavity in terms of
the subgradients being negatively co-monotone to consumption. The following lemma
states the Afriat inequalities:
Lemma 2 Given φ ∈ RS++ as well as consumptions and prices (c(i), ρ(i))i∈E , the
following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a utility function with strictly increasing, strictly concave and con-
tinuous u(c, s), s ∈ S, such that for all i ∈ E
c(i) ∈ arg max
c∈RS+
S∑
s=1
φsu(cs, s) s.t. (φ ◦ ρ(i)) · (c − c(i)) ≤ 0.
2. Consumptions and prices (c(i), ρ(i))i∈E satisfy the following ‘Afriat inequalities’.
There exist (λ(i))i∈E  0 such that for any s ∈ S and all i, j ∈ E
(cs(i) − cs( j))(λ(i)ρs(i) − λ( j)ρs( j)) ≤ 0, (1)
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with strict inequality if cs(i) = cs( j) and with λ(i)ρs(i) = λ( j)ρs( j) if cs(i) =
cs( j) > 0.
Proof 1. ⇒ 2. The claim follows from convex analysis, see Rockafellar (1970).
For all s ∈ S the function u(·, s) has a nonempty subdifferential ∂cs u(cs, s) and
vs > 0 for all subgradients vs ∈ ∂cs u(cs, s). Optimality of c(i) implies that there
exist vs(i) ∈ ∂cs u(cs(i), s) as well as λ(i) > 0 such that φsvs(i) − λ(i)φsρs(i) ≤ 0
and equal to zero if cs(i) > 0. Strict concavity of each u(·, s) and cs(i) > cs( j)
implies vs(i) < vs( j) and thus λ(i)ρs(i) < λ( j)ρs( j). Note that cs(i) = cs( j) > 0
immediately implies λ(i)ρs(i) = λ( j)ρs( j). Now the Afriat inequalities follow.
2. ⇒ 1. Assume without loss of generality that cs(1) ≤ cs(2) ≤ · · · ≤ cs(N ).
Define a positive and strictly decreasing piecewise linear function by setting
u′(cs(i), s) = λ(i)ρs(i) for cs(i) > 0 and u′(0, s) = 1 + max j λ( j)ρs( j). Moreover,
for c > 0 with cs(i) < c < cs(i+1) let u′(c, s) = u′(cs(i), s)+ c−cs(i)cs (i+1)−cs (i) (u′(cs(i+
1), s) − u′(cs(i), s)) (including the special case cs(0) = 0 if cs(1) > 0). The con-
structed marginal utility functions are positive and strictly decreasing and thus integrate
to strictly increasing and strictly concave utility functions on the respective intervals
[0, k) for k > cs(N ). Observe that by construction the necessary and sufficient first-
order conditions for the utility maximization problem are satisfied. unionsq
Unlike the case of general utility functions, where versions of the strong axiom of
revealed preferences (e.g., GARP) provide an alternative characterization, no equiva-
lent conditions that are quantifier-free are known for additively separable utility func-
tions. Varian (1983a) discusses various specifications for which GARP-like restrictions
can be derived, but for the case of additively separable utility, he concludes “I have been
unable to find a convenient combinatorial condition that is necessary and sufficient
for additive separability”. While we cannot give conditions that are simultaneously
necessary and sufficient we can state simple necessary as well as sufficient conditions
for the Afriat inequalities in the presence of additively separable utility functions.
The necessary condition considers the case where in one shock consumption
increases while in some other it weakly decreases. In this situation the supporting
price of the first shock must decrease relative to the price of the second shock. The
sufficient condition considers the case of consumption increasing in all shocks, that
is, there is no shock where consumption weakly decreases. In this case there are no
restrictions on supporting prices.
Lemma 3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for consumption and price vectors
(c(i), ρ(i))i∈E to satisfy the Afriat inequalities are as follows:
(N) If cs(i) > cs( j) then the Afriat inequalities imply for all i, j ∈ E and all s′ = s,
cs′(i) ≤ cs′( j) ⇒ ρs′(i)/ρs(i)
ρs′( j)/ρs( j)
> 1.
(S) If for all i, j , c(i)  c( j) (or vice versa), then consumption vectors (c(i))i∈E ≥ 0
and any arbitrary price vectors (ρ(i))i∈E  0 satisfy the Afriat inequalities.
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Proof For the proof of the sufficient conditions suppose without loss of generality
that c(1)  c(2)  · · ·  c(N ). Observe that it is possible to choose λ(1) > λ(2) >
· · · > λ(N ) both sufficiently large and different such that λ(i)ρ(i)  λ(i +1)ρ(i +1)
for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and so that conditions (1) in statement 2 of Lemma 2 are
satisfied.
Conversely, conditions (1) imply if cs(i) > cs( j) for some s ∈ S that 0 <
λ(i)ρs(i) < λ( j)ρs( j). Similarly, cs′(i) ≤ cs′( j) implies λ(i)ρs′(i) ≥ λ( j)ρs′( j) ≥
0. Dividing the second weak inequality by the first strict inequality then yields the
inequality of the lemma. unionsq
Lemma 3 is important for most of our arguments below. Although the lemma
appears simple, especially the sufficiency part turns out to be applicable to a variety
of situations.
3.3 Equilibrium
The following lemma specializes the key result of Brown and Matzkin (1996) to the
case of additively separable utility.
Lemma 4 (Brown and Matzkin 1996) Observations on prices and individual endow-
ments (ρ(i), (eh(i))h∈H)i∈E , are consistent with equilibrium if and only if there exist
ch(i) ∈ RS+ for all h ∈ H and all i ∈ E such that
(i) For each h, (ch(i), ρ(i))i∈E satisfy the Afriat inequalities.
(ii) (φ ◦ ρ(i)) · (ch(i) − eh(i)) = 0 for all i ∈ E and all h ∈ H.
(iii) ∑Hh=1(ch(i) − eh(i)) = 0 for all i ∈ E .
The proof follows directly from Brown and Matzkin (1996). For prices to lie on an
equilibrium correspondence, there have to exist budget-feasible individual consump-
tions that satisfy the Afriat inequalities which characterize choice compatible with
utility maximization.
4 Restrictions on counterfactual analysis
As pointed out above, restrictions on counterfactual analysis can be divided into restric-
tions on beliefs and restrictions on probability-free prices ρ. The restrictions on beliefs
are clear. Given any two observations on Arrow prices, A(1), A(2), the largest eigen-
value and the eigenvector associated with these prices have to be the same. Further-
more, the largest eigenvalue has to be less than 1. Theorem 1 shows that as far as
probabilities and discounting are concerned these are the necessary and sufficient
restrictions. The remaining question now concerns what we can say about the associ-
ated ρ(1), ρ(2). We refer to restrictions on price changes always as restrictions on ρ
assuming that probabilities remain constant.
In this section we derive conditions on profiles of endowments which are necessary
in order for price changes not to be arbitrary, as well as conditions that are sufficient for
restrictions to exist. It is useful to distinguish two cases. We first assume that individual
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endowments change but aggregate endowments in each state s ∈ S remain constant
across observations; then we move to the case that aggregate as well as individual
endowments vary.
4.1 Constant aggregate endowments
Lemma 3 implies that for specified fixed aggregate endowments any finite set of distri-
butions of individual endowments together with any prices are always consistent with
equilibrium. This fact follows because we can choose each observation’s individual
consumption to be collinear to aggregate consumption. Generically the consump-
tions will all be different and strictly ordered. More formally, and without genericity
assumptions, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Suppose N observations on individual endowments and prices ((eh(i)),
ρ(i))i∈E ≥ 0, ρ(i)  0 for all i ∈ E , satisfy
∑
h e
h
s (i) =
∑
h e
h
s ( j) for all s ∈ S and
all i, j ∈ E . Then the observations are consistent with equilibrium, independently of
φ  0.
Proof Given any φ ∈ RS++, for all h ∈ H and i ∈ E define consumption ch(i) ∈ RS++
by
ch(i) = (φ ◦ ρ(i)) · e
h(i)
(φ ◦ ρ(i)) · e(i) · e(i) + 
h(i)
with perturbations h(i) ∈ RS . These perturbations can be chosen arbitrarily small so
that ch(i)  ch( j) (or vice versa) for any i = j while also satisfying (φ◦ρ(i))·h(i) =
0 and
∑
h∈H h(i) = 0. (Note, there are only finitely many observations.) Now Condi-
tion (S) of Lemma 3 implies that the Afriat inequalities are satisfied for the constructed
consumption vectors (ch(i))i∈E and any arbitrary prices (ρ(i))i∈E  0. Moreover,
by construction markets clear and the budget constraints are satisfied. Thus, all three
conditions of Lemma 4 are satisfied and the theorem follows. unionsq
Balasko and Tvede (2009a) derive the same result for an economy with general
(i.e., not necessarily separable) utility. Our result is slightly stronger since theirs does
not imply ours. Their method of proof (which is very different from ours) may also be
used to derive our result. Balasko and Tvede reach the rather negative conclusion that
‘finite collections of data that are not included in any equilibrium manifold make up a
set that is certainly not large’. While this seems to suggest that for many global com-
parative statics exercises general equilibrium imposes no restrictions on observables,
the crucial assumption in their analysis is that aggregate endowments remain constant.
Therefore, their results (and our Theorem 2) are somewhat comparable to Mas-Colell
(1977) who shows that without any variations in endowments, the equilibrium set can
be arbitrary.
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4.2 Changes in aggregate endowments
Intuitively, clear restrictions should arise if aggregate endowments change. If, for
example, aggregate endowments become more risky, prices in a representative agent
economy become more volatile. One would expect that even with several hetero-
geneous agents, someone has to bear the risk and equilibrium prices must change
accordingly. We first show that this intuition depends crucially on the values of indi-
vidual endowments. One can always construct changes in individual endowments that
destroy this intuition and lead to a situation where price changes can be arbitrary. Then
we show that in the simple benchmark case of constant endowment shares across obser-
vations strong restrictions indeed do exist. In fact a much weaker assumption suffices
to guarantee restrictions. We discuss this issue in detail below.
4.2.1 The role of individual endowments
When individual endowments are allowed to change arbitrarily together with aggregate
endowments and if there are sufficiently many different agents, there are no restrictions
on possible price changes. In other words, for given aggregate endowments (which
may vary or be constant across observations) we can construct individual endow-
ments such that there are no restrictions on associated prices. The following theorem
formalizes this fact:
Theorem 3 Given aggregate endowments (e(i))i∈E  0 and any φ  0, there
always exist H ≥ N agents with individual endowments (eh(i))h∈Hi∈E  0 satisfying∑
h e
h(i) = e(i) such that any arbitrary positive prices (ρ(i))i∈E  0 are consistent
with equilibrium.
Proof Without loss of generality, we consider H = N . For sufficiently small  > 0,
let endowments of an individual h in observation i for each shock s ∈ S be as follows:
ehs (i) =
{
i + δes(i) if i = h
es(i) − (H − 1)(i + δes(i)) otherwise.
For sufficiently small  > 0 and δ = 0, individual consumption ch(i) = eh(i) is bud-
get feasible, independently of prices. For each agent h the consumption vectors are
also strictly ordered and thus satisfy Condition (S) of Lemma 3. Therefore, for each
agent the Afriat inequalities are satisfied, too, and all three conditions of Lemma 4
hold. unionsq
Note that the construction hinges critically on H ≥ N . We do not know if a similar
construction works with fewer agents. However, for a fixed number of agents we can
always construct examples where price changes cannot be arbitrary.
Example 1 Consider S = 3, H = 2 and e(1) = (10, 1, 1), e(2) = (1, 10, 1), e(3) =
(1, 1, 10). No matter what individual endowments, prices ρ(1) = ρ(2) = ρ(3) cannot
be rationalized.
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Note that one of the two agents must consume at least five units in the high-endowment
state in (at least) two observations. W.l.o.g. suppose c11(1) ≥ 5 and c12(2) ≥ 5. Thus,
c12(1) < c
1
2(2) but
ρ2(1)/ρ1(1)
ρ2(2)/ρ1(2)
= 1
and so Condition (N) of Lemma 3 is violated. That is, the first agent’s consumption
imposes restrictions on possible price changes.
This discussion points to one possible way how our initial intuition may fail.
Changes in aggregate consumption might not be reflected in changes in individual
consumption if at the same time incomes change in a way that the changes in aggre-
gate consumption become irrelevant and individuals’ consumption remains strictly
ordered. This observation suggests that one possible way to obtain restrictions is to
hold the fraction of individual endowments to aggregate endowments constant in
each state across all observations, i.e., there are κhs > 0,
∑
h κ
h
s = 1, such that
ehs (i) = κhs es(i) for all observations i = 1, . . . , N . This assumption guarantees that
there are prices for which in fact everybody will have higher consumption in shock s
for an observation where aggregate endowments in shock s are higher. Note that this
is a much weaker assumption than assuming collinear individual endowments—we
return to this assumption in Sect. 5 below.
4.2.2 Sufficient conditions for restrictions
Constant endowment shares do ensure that there exist restrictions, but an assumption
in the same spirit that is much weaker suffices. Price changes are restricted if there
are two observations i, j such that in some shock s each individual’s endowments
increase (from observation i to observation j) while in some other shock s′ aggregate
endowments weakly decrease (from i to j). Note that the resulting change in aggregate
endowments is also a necessary (and sufficient) condition for restrictions in the single
agent case.
Theorem 4 Suppose there are two observations i = 1, 2 and shocks s, s′ ∈ S with
ehs (1) > ehs (2) for all agents h ∈ H and es′(1) ≤ es′(2). Then prices cannot be
arbitrary.
Proof Given profiles of endowments and any φ  0, we show that there exist
price vectors ρ(1), ρ(2)  0 that are not consistent with equilibrium. We normalize
ρs′(i) = 1 for both observations. Because ehs (1) > ehs (2) we can choose , δ > 0 such
that ehs (1) −  > ehs (2) + δ. Next we can choose prices ρs(2) < ρs(1) sufficiently
large such that for each agent h, the budget constraints
(φ ◦ ρ(i)) · ch(i) ≤ (φ ◦ ρ(i)) · eh(i)
yield the following implications: If for an agent h it holds that chs (1) ≤ ehs (1)− then it
follows that ch
s′(1) > es′(1). Similarly, if for an agent h it holds that c
h
s (2) ≥ ehs (2)+δ
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then it follows that ch
s′(2) < 0. Market clearing and the non-negativity constraints on
consumption thus ensure chs (1) > chs (2) for all agents h ∈ H. Market clearing also
implies for at least one agent h that ch
s′(1) ≤ chs′(2). But by construction the prices
ρs(1) > ρs(2) satisfy
ρs′ (1)/ρs (1)
ρs′ (2)/ρs (2)
= 1/ρs (1)1/ρs (2) < 1 and so Condition (N) of Lemma 3 is
not satisfied. The Afriat inequalities cannot hold. unionsq
The theorem may at first appear to contradict Balasko and Tvede (2009a) claim that
their result on the absence of restrictions can be extended to an open neighborhood of
endowments. While our result does require the strong assumption of separable utility
[made neither in Balasko and Tvede (2009a) nor in Balasko and Tvede (2009b)], this
is not the main difference. Balasko and Tvede (2009a) show that for given profiles
of endowments and prices there is always a small open neighborhood for which the
observations are still consistent with equilibrium. We show that if endowments satisfy
the inequalities in Theorem 4, no matter how small the differences across observations,
there always exist prices that are inconsistent with equilibrium.
5 Counterfactual analysis and the representative agent
The analysis in the previous section reveals the key role of the interplay between aggre-
gate and individual endowments. This observation naturally motivates us to compare
the restrictions imposed by models with heterogeneous agents and models with a
representative agent. Naturally, aggregate endowments in the heterogeneous-agents
model are the corresponding endowments of the representative agent. Since we do not
confine ourselves to any specific type of felicity functions, we do not need to be con-
cerned about the aggregation of preferences (see Hara et al. (2007) and Hara (2008)
for recent results on this topic).
We now examine the possible relationships between restrictions in models with a
heterogeneous agent and restrictions in models with a representative agent. As a first
step we show that restrictions from a representative-agent model carry over to a model
with multiple agents if we choose the endowments of one agent sufficiently large and
the endowments of all other agents very small. This observation is the content of the
following result:
Theorem 5 For given aggregate endowments (e(i))i∈E , all different across observa-
tions, and prices that are inconsistent with a representative agent there always exist
individual endowments (eh(i))h∈H  0, ∑h eh(i) = e(i) such that these prices
cannot be equilibrium prices.
Proof For  > 0, take ehs (i) =  for all h = 1, . . . , H − 1, all i and all s. Since
consumer H has to consume on his budget set, eventually, for sufficiently small ,
his consumption is arbitrary close to aggregate endowments and hence if prices and
choices are inconsistent for aggregate endowments, they must be inconsistent for the
representative agent, as well as for agent H whose consumption can be forced to be
arbitrarily close to the representative agent’s consumption. unionsq
The proof of the theorem relies on very extreme endowments. This feature is only
a sufficient condition. We can easily construct an example where for a large set of
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individual endowments the counterfactual analysis for a representative agent econ-
omy has also to hold in an economy with several agents.
Example 2 Consider N = 2, H = 2, S = 2 and suppose that φ = (1, 1), ρ(1) =
(1, 1), e(1) = (3, 1) and e(2) = (1, 3). Also suppose that e11(1) + e12(1) = 3 and
e11(2) + e12(2) < 3. Then it is impossible that prices and endowments in the second
observation satisfy
ρ1(2)e11(2) + ρ2(2)e12(2) > 2ρ1(2) + ρ2(2)
and
ρ1(2) + 2ρ2(2) > ρ1(2)e11(2) + ρ2(2)e12(2).
In observation 1 agent 1 consumes somewhere on his budget line that connects the
points (3, 0) and (2, 1) in the Edgeworth box. If ρ1(2)e11(2)+ρ2(2)e12(2) > 2ρ1(2)+
ρ2(2) then agent 1 can afford any consumption in observation 2 that he could have
afforded in observation 1 and that lies in the Edgeworth box for observation 1. The
weak axiom of revealed preferences then implies that at prices and incomes of obser-
vation 1, the agent cannot afford the consumption he chose at observation 2. Since in
observation 2 he must choose somewhere on his budget line in the Edgeworth box,
it is certainly impossible that at prices and income of observation 1 he could afford
everything in observation 2’s Edgeworth box that he can afford under income and
prices of observation 2. So it is impossible that the two budget lines cross outside of
both of the two Edgeworth boxes, i.e., that ρ1(2)+2ρ2(2) > ρ1(2)e11(2)+ρ2(2)e12(2).
The restrictions in Example 2 follow from restrictions on agent 1’s choices. Yet,
this agent seems far from a ‘dominating’ agent whose consumption must be close to
aggregate endowments.
5.1 More or fewer restrictions through heterogeneity?
Theorem 5 and Example 2 show that it is certainly possible for the restrictions from
a representative-agent economy to carry over to the heterogeneous agents economy.
We next show that such a relationship does not hold in general. In fact, anything can
happen, the heterogeneous-agent economy may impose an altogether different set of
restrictions than the corresponding representative-agent economy.
We can easily construct an example of a representative-agent economy that imposes
restrictions. Theorem 3 then readily implies that we can construct a corresponding het-
erogeneous-agents economy without any restrictions.
The converse relationship is also possible, that is, there are no restrictions for the
representative agent but for appropriately chosen individual endowments the heter-
ogeneous-agents economy imposes restrictions. Suppose e(i)  e(i + 1) for all
i = 1, . . . , N − 1. Condition (S) of Lemma 3 implies that price changes can be arbi-
trary for a representative agent. With heterogeneous agents this is false. The following
example proves this fact:
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Example 3 Consider S = 2 states with N = 3 observations with aggregate endow-
ments of e(1) = (1, 1), e(2) = (1.1, 10), e(3) = (1.2, 100) and suppose φ = (1, 1).
For H = 2 agents with e1(1) = (1−, 1−), e1(2) = (1/2, 1), and e1(3) = (0.9, 50)
the prices ρ(1) = ρ(2) = ρ(3) = (1, 1/1000) are inconsistent with equilibrium if
 > 0 is sufficiently small.
Condition (N) of Lemma 3 implies that for prices to remain constant across observa-
tions consumptions must be strictly ordered. However, the following argument shows
that it is impossible that both agents’ consumptions are ordered across observations. If
c1(1) and c1(2) are ordered then budget feasibility for agent 1 combined with market
clearing implies c1(1)  c1(2). By the same argument, for sufficiently small , it
is impossible that c1(3)  c1(1). But if c1(1)  c1(3) and c1(1)  c1(2), it is
impossible that for agent 2 c2(2) and c2(3) are ordered. Agent 1 consumes less than 1
in shock 2 in both observation 2 and 3 and so market clearing implies c22(3) > c22(2).
But since agent 1 consumes close to 0.9 in shock 1 in observation 3 and close to 0.5
in observation 2, market clearing must imply that c21(3) < c21(2).
The example shows that agent heterogeneity can, given particular individual endow-
ments, impose additional restrictions on global comparative statics. Of course, for this
to happen it is crucial that the distribution of endowments changes together with
aggregate endowments.
Observe that the construction in the example needs N ≥ 3 observations. For N = 2
observations no such example exists; instead, if aggregate endowments and prices are
consistent with a representative agent then they must be consistent with a heteroge-
neous-agent economy for any individual endowments. With only two observations we
can always construct individual consumptions to be strictly ordered so that Condition
(S) of Lemma 3 is satisfied.
We summarize our comparison of representative-agent and heterogeneous-agents
economies in the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Restrictions in the representative agent economy are neither necessary
nor (for N ≥ 3) sufficient for restrictions in the heterogeneous agents economy.
Proof Theorem 3 implies that for a representative agent economy with restrictions
we can always construct a heterogeneous agents economy without restrictions.
Theorem 5 implies that for a representative agent economy with restrictions we
can always construct a heterogeneous agents economy having the same restrictions.
Example 3 shows a representative agent economy without restrictions and a corre-
sponding heterogeneous agents economy with restrictions. unionsq
5.2 Collinear endowments
It is difficult to find general conditions on individual endowments that imply that
representative agent restrictions carry over to the economy with several agents. As
an illustration, we consider the simple (but for some applications relevant) case of
collinear endowments. Theorem 4 states that there are restrictions for the hetero-
geneous-agent economy whenever there are restrictions for the representative-agent
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economy: For the presence of restrictions aggregate endowments have to increase in
one state and weakly decrease in another. Since individual endowments are a fixed
fraction of aggregate endowments, the condition of the theorem holds.
Note that the representative agent conditions on prices are sufficient in this case,
since each agent can simply consume his endowments. However, the following exam-
ple shows that while price changes cannot be arbitrary, counter-intuitive price changes
that are impossible for the single agent economy are now possible.
Example 4 Suppose H = 2, S = 2, N = 2 with e1(1) = e2(1) = (1, 2), e1(2) =
e2(2) = (1, 2.01) and φ = (1, 1). Prices ρ(1) = (1, 0.5) and ρ(2) = (1, 0.6) are
possible in the heterogeneous agent economy, although endowments are identical and
these prices are impossible in the representative agent model.
We show that the three conditions of Lemma 4 are satisfied. Let the two agents’ con-
sumption vectors be c1(1) = (1.3, 1.4), c2(1) = (0.7, 2.6) and c1(2) = (1.31, 2.01−
0.31/0.6), c2(2) = (0.69, 2.01 + 0.31/0.6). These consumption vectors satisfy the
market clearing conditions and budget equations. Condition (S) of Lemma 3 also holds
since c1(1) << c1(2) and c2(1) >> c2(2). Thus, the Afriat inequalities hold.
Now consider the representative agent economy with consumptions and endow-
ments c(1) = e(1) = (2, 4) and c(2) = e(2) = (2, 4.02). Since c2(2) > c2(1) and
c1(2) = c1(1) Condition (N) of Lemma 3 is violated,
ρ1(2)/ρ2(2)
ρ1(1)/ρ2(1)
= 1/0.6
1/0.5
< 1
and so the Afriat inequalities do not hold.
The reason why the representative agent intuition does not carry over to a model
with different tastes is as follows. If one agent is close to risk neutral, an increase in the
price of a shock with large aggregate endowments results in a decrease of the agent’s
consumption in both shocks, the more risk-averse agent’s consumption increases in
both shocks and the resulting aggregate consumption can increase in the shock where
the price increased.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the possible equilibrium price changes that can result from
changes in individual endowments in the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with
dynamically complete markets. We perform this analysis under the assumption of
time-separable preferences, an assumption that is almost standard in general equi-
librium models in macroeconomics, finance, and public finance. We make no other
assumptions, in particular no assumptions on specific parametric specifications of the
utility functions. Our results thus apply to a large class of economically interesting
models.
We establish three main results. First, we show that equilibrium price changes can
be arbitrary if individual endowments vary but aggregate endowments are held fixed.
Second, we show that changes in aggregate endowments always lead to restrictions on
possible price changes, if in at least one state aggregate endowments weakly decrease
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while in some other state all individuals’ endowments increase. Last, we show that
restrictions from the representative-agent version of the model are neither necessary
nor sufficient for restrictions in a heterogeneous agents economy.
Despite our mild assumptions, which hold in many instances of counterfactual
policy analysis in economic practice, we are able to show that restrictions on equilib-
rium prices do exist. This paper, therefore, serves as a general framework for future
research into the exact nature of these restrictions. Our results suggest that a more
specific description of possible restrictions will require much stronger assumptions on
the economic model.
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